As a long-hostile of Taliban and excluded from the ongoing Afghan peace process, New Delhi is growing its engagement with Taliban, to safeguard its interests and installations in Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of US forces from the country.
In 2007, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president at the time, initiated warmer ties with Taliban leaders who were unhappy about Pakistan’s control over their movement, but he opposed the labeling of them as a “good Taliban.” Karzai also asked India to establish links with these members of the Taliban, but the foreign minister of India, Pranab Mukherjee, rejected the request and stated that “some make a distinction between ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’ – I don’t, because I’ve seen the Taliban, they have only one cult – the cult of violence,.”
Yet over one decade later, India announced an unofficial mission to the 2018 Moscow Summit for the Afghan peace process. That event was initially postponed due to the strong opposition of the Afghan government, but it took place two months later, and two retired Indian diplomats — Amar Sinha and T.C.A. Raghavan — were among the participants. It was the first time that Indian representatives met Taliban leaders.
During the US-Taliban talks in Qatar, various states other than the governments of Afghanistan and India were involved. Since 2001, India has spent over a $1 billion in infrastructure building, humanitarian assistance and investment in Afghanistan and, therefore, its exclusion from the Doha talks raised concerns among Indian analysts and diplomats. Yet by sending retired officials to Moscow in 2018 and welcoming the recent US-Taliban peace deal, India is changing its stance toward the Afghan peace process.
To understand more about New Delhi’s view of the peace process, we must first analyze the country’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan.
Indian Foreign Policy Toward Afghanistan
In his book, “My Enemy’s Enemy,” Avinash Paliwal believes that India’s Afghan policy is influenced by three factors: to minimize or balance Pakistan’s influence over Kabul; international pressure on Delhi to adjust its position toward Afghanistan; and the interests, priorities and policies of the various Afghan governments and its stance toward Islamabad. These issues have compelled India to reformulate its regional foreign policy.
According to Paliwal, India’s approach toward Afghanistan is shuttling between the protagonists of the Partisan and the Reconciliatory groups in the policy-making think tanks of India for those that are Partisan, surmise that Delhi has to invest on anti-Pakistan groups and individuals inside Afghanistan. According to this perspective, making cordial relations with pro-Pakistan groups is useless. While the Reconciliatory perceive that creating a balance between Delhi and Islamabad’s influence over Kabul and to protect India’s national interests in Afghanistan will be productive for India. This would allow it to establish and maintain its relationship with whoever comes to power in Afghanistan, without looking to the nature of its relations with Islamabad. The latter approach would also maintain India’s positive image among Afghans, ensure the domestic stability of the country and, in return, guarantee protection of Indian interests.
Factors Blocking India-Taliban Relations
When they ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban had the political, military and financial support of Pakistan, a fierce foe of India. The Taliban have since continued to have friendly relations with Islamabad. Under the Taliban regime, India was forced to close its embassy in Kabul, which was due to the influence that Pakistan had over the Taliban government at that time. Along with Iran and Russia, India supported the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban, non-Pashtun group. During the early days of its reign, the Taliban asked India to reopen its embassy in Kabul, a request that was rejected. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 following the NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization that had found refuge under the Taliban, India reestablished diplomatic ties with the new Afghan government and opened its embassy in Kabul. India has since supported the counterinsurgency strategy of the Afghan government toward the Taliban and provides equipment to the Afghan forces.
Based on the pledges to build on their bilateral friendship, agreements between Afghanistan and India were signed in 2002 as both nations grew closer. India believes that having any links with the Taliban would destroy the legitimacy of the Afghan government and, therefore, Delhi has avoided establishing ties with the Taliban. India still follows its policy of the mid-90s toward the Taliban and supports the Afghan government. Meanwhile, Iran and Russia, which previously had a similar political approach like that of India, are now in the process of building relations with the Taliban.
The Taliban enjoys the support of the Pakistani military and intelligence, while Taliban leaders and their military and economic councils are based in major cities of Pakistan. Islamabad still has influence over the Taliban in the ongoing Afghan peace process. From an Indian perspective, any talks under the control of Pakistan are not credible. According to analysts interviewed by NPR, Pakistan aims to use its involvement in the Afghan talks to enhance its political influence over Kabul and seek foreign intervention in Kashmir, a region that is disputed by India, Pakistan and China. In a process where Pakistan has an upper-hand role and the Afghan government has been elbowed in the face, India will not get involved.
Prior to 2014, the US and Britain had often asked India to increase its economic and military assistance in Afghanistan. Just a few years ago, while announcing his South Asian strategy, US President Donald Trump also made a request for India to play a significant role in the country. Despite US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the US special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, sharing frequent notes about the peace talks with the Taliban, there is no space for India to maneuver in the conflict resolution of Afghanistan. Indian involvement in the Afghan peace process is not only being blocked by Pakistan, but now it seems that even Washington does not consider India’s role to be vital. The Trump administration believes that India’s extensive engagement in this issue would persuade Pakistan to sabotage the process.
India’s limitations in Afghanistan’s Affairs
The lack of a shared border with Afghanistan and the geographical location of Pakistan between Delhi and Kabul have constrained India’s from having a more significant influence in Afghan affairs. In the last 18 years, India’s role in the economic development, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and investment in natural resources in Afghanistan has developed a positive image of India among Afghans and paved a way for Indian soft power in the country. India thinks that having a military presence in the country and developing ties with the Taliban would result in it losing the trust of Afghans. India’s indifference with its presence in Afghanistan and role in resolving the conflict is also based on it lacking the capability. For Indian officials, if NATO forces failed to end the Afghan conflict, then how would Indian soldiers be expected to do so?
India has upheld its interests in Afghanistan through internal groups and external partner nations. In the 1980s, the Afghan communist government and the Soviet Union protected India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, India, along with Russia and Iran, supported the Northern Alliance to deter the expansion of Taliban control in the country. Since 2001, despite the insurgency that has rocked the country, relative stability was brought to Afghanistan by NATO forces. This gave India a chance to develop its engagement in Afghanistan.
India’s dependence on foreign troops and its exclusion from the Doha talks have increased its concerns about its future interests in Afghanistan. At the same time, Delhi has lost a chance to establish relations with the Taliban. Yet despite this, India now has ambitions to be part of the process.
Factors of India’s Ambitions
As Pakistan is more active in the Afghan peace process, India does not want to be left behind. India fears an Afghanistan that is ruled a pro-Islamabad government and where it the country once again becomes a safe-haven for insurgents who are fighting in Kashmir. Delhi perceives that its inclusion in the peace process would not only balance Pakistan’s influence over Kabul but, with the withdrawal of foreign troops, it would also protect its interests in a future Afghanistan.
India, as a strategic partner of Afghanistan, is a single state that ceaselessly insists on the inclusion in Afghan affairs. If it was involved in the peace process, India could lobby for the Afghan government and ward off Pakistani interference. To uphold its millions of dollars in investment in Afghanistan, India is eagerly interested participating in the peace process between the Taliban and the Afghan government. According to Happymon Jacob, the insistence of India to only maintain relations with a legitimate Afghan government is a case of lazy diplomacy.
If all NATO forces withdraw from the country, New Delhi aims to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the new training camp for terrorist organization. This same concern was also shown by Syed Akbaruddin, India’s permanent envoy to the UN. “The sanctuaries and safe havens provided to terror networks have to be addressed for genuine and sustainable peace…,” he said in 2019.
The consensus regarding the necessity of peace talks with the Taliban is another factor for India’s changing stance toward the peace process. Not only the Afghan government, but even regional states and the international community are agreed on the need for conflict resolution in Afghanistan. Russia and Iran, which were two of India’s two strategic partners in the 1990s when it came to Afghanistan, now have open relations with the Taliban. It seems that this strategic shift has forced New Delhi to come out from self-isolation and try to proactively involve itself in the peace process.
The peace that suits India
India wants a peace deal that is led and owned by Afghans, one in which the government in Kabul, as an agency and voice of the people, must play a more substantial role. New Delhi insists on the inclusion of the Afghan government in any peace talks with the Taliban, including the negotiations in Doha with the US.
Before the Afghan presidential election in September 2019, the US and Afghan opposition leaders demanded that the government postponed the election for the sake of peace talks with the Taliban to pave the way for an interim government. Last June, during his meeting with Secretary Pompeo, Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval considered the presidential election as a separate process from the peace talks. At the same meeting, Doval also opposed the suspension of the election and the formation of an interim government. Any type of government that will emerge out of the intra-Afghan peace dialogue will only be acceptable to India if Pakistan does have influence over the parties.
The wait-and-see approach by India has become counterproductive for New Delhi. In general, India has not taken any practical steps to help end the Afghan conflict. It has only supported the withdrawal of foreign forces if that ensures an enduring peace in Afghanistan and prevents the internal strife seen in the 1990s. If Pakistani influence over the intra-Afghan dialogue is not deterred, which would result in Islamabad gaining a greater foothold in Afghan affairs, New Delhi could sabotage the peace process and back anti-Pakistan groups in Afghanistan.
Burkha Dutt, an Indian analyst who focuses on Kashmir, argued in an article at The Washington Post, that the revocation of the special status in Jammu and Kashmir by India in 2019 has direct links with Afghan peace process. From her perspective, in order to get room to maneuver in the talks and minimize Pakistan’s influence over both the US-Taliban deal and intra-Afghan dialogue, India aims to sabotage the negotiations.
Consequently, Pakistan believes that the solution to the Kashmir conflict lies in the Afghan peace talks. Thus, Khalilzad, the US special envoy, traveled between Doha to Delhi to find a solution for the Kashmir stalemate in a bid to protect the US-Taliban talks from the aftershocks of India’s revocation Article 370, which provide a special status to Jammu and Kashmir. India is the only country that might lose once foreign forces leave Afghanistan.
The Taliban, as it seems, are now frustrated from the fight and more inclined to sign a peace deal with the Afghan government, as they want to become an indispensable part of the future political structure of the country. According to statements by the Taliban’s negotiators in Doha, they are ready to share political power with other Afghans and form a broad-based political structure, once an agreement is reached following the intra-Afghan peace talks. The Taliban are also willing to continue bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations with regional states and the international community. With this in mind, coupled with its aim to protect its interests inside Afghanistan, India needs to engage diplomatically with the Taliban and, at the same time, ensure the support, sovereignty and legitimacy of the Afghan government.
The participation of unofficial Indian representatives at the 2018 Moscow Summit has shown recalibration in India’s conventional policy toward Afghanistan. Even after the collapse of Taliban regime in 2001, Indian intelligence contacted Taliban leaders to agree not to target each other’s personnel. According to a report, last year, India covertly contacted the Taliban to receive a guarantee about the “protection of Indian interests and installations after a U.S. withdrawal.” Due to Pakistan establishment control over Taliban, they are unlikely to ensure the protection of Indian investment and citizens after the exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
However, there are still some elements in the Taliban leadership who opposes Pakistan’s influence on their movement and they are not interested in unnecessary hostility toward India. Once an intra-Afghan peace deal is inked, India will support a political structure in which the current Afghan government, the political opposition and the Taliban have a share in, but only one that is not influenced by Pakistan. India may have missed out on the US-Taliban negotiations in Doha, but it is the Afghan talks where India can play a vital role.
** Dawood Mohammadi is a Research Fellow with Tarzi Research Foundation-Kabul and a Conflict Analyst with Afghanistan Affairs Unit. He writes on Afghanistan Foreign Policy, Peace Process and Geopolitics in South Asia. @DaudMohammadi
