US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad has arrived in Kabul to consult and confer with Afghan leaders on progress and future steps of the Afghan peace process, following Afghan government’s strong criticism of the ongoing US-Taliban talks that have kept Kabul out of the loop. President Ghani’s National Security Adviser Hamdullah Moheb even went on to claim that Khalilzad was seeking to “delegitimize” Afghan government, and then become a viceroy for Afghanistan. The comments drew strong rebuke from Washington, with Western officials, particularly Americans since then boycotting any meetings while Moheb is also in attendance. The National Security Adviser was also absent from the recent meeting between President Ghani and Khalilzad held the Presidential Palace.
But this time, the US envoy’s trip is more important from different perspectives than his previous ones as it comes at the peak of mutual mistrust between the two sides. Relations between Kabul and Washington have never been as strained as now since President Ghani took up office. Kabul, more particularly President Ghani’s inner circle, is suspicious of the intentions of Americans, alleging that Afghanistan not only has been left out of the US-Taliban peace negotiations, but Americans have also kept it in the dark about the details of meetings.
Another point that adds to the significance of the visit is the chasm between Kabul and Washington with regard to the form intra-Afghan dialogue. Washington insists on the formation of an inclusive negotiating team for intra-Afghan talks with the Taliban that includes representatives of all Afghan political groups in addition to government, but Kabul does not want government representatives to be part of such a team. As one of the main sides in the conflict, the government is trying to have its own negotiation team, and that is why it has repeatedly rejected Khalilzad’s call to establish an inclusive team. Additionally, getting closer to the time when Taliban usually announce their spring offensive makes Khalilzad’s job more difficult. By mid-April every year, the militants launch their spring operation. If a deal is not reached prior to the announcement, Afghanistan will have to go through a new bloody wave of violence and bloodshed.
Khalilzad has to first bridge the existing trust deficit with Afghan government, and ensure the creation of an inclusive negotiating team for intra-Afghan talks before leaving Kabul. Moreover, the focus of this round of his talks with the Taliban should be on ceasefire. The best scenario would be the ceasefire; however, if he fails to convince the Taliban to accept it, he should urge them at least not to announce their spring offensive.
