Even as suicide bombings in Afghanistan continue, the United States is preparing to withdraw roughly half of the 12,000 to 13,000 troops it has currently deployed. The announcement of this withdrawal may play well for some in political terms domestically, but it is an unnecessary concession diplomatically as negotiations proceed with the Taliban. A predetermined withdrawal not only threatens stability in Afghanistan, but it also signals to allies and adversaries elsewhere that the US lacks resiliency.
The remaining US troops in Afghanistan primarily support local partners with surveillance, air support, training, and advice. Compared to earlier stages of the war, when large numbers of American troops were responsible for major combat operations, the current mission allows a small force to work by, with, and through partners to limit US losses and transition Afghan partners toward security independence. This is a slow, tough process, but it becomes even more so when adversaries do not believe the US will remain committed to it. Additionally, the further withdrawal of American forces will increase the burden on the 8,500 NATO forces and other partners.
The Taliban predicts that the US will leave Afghanistan before these partners are ready to operate without American support and has exercised strategic patience to wait for a US withdrawal. By waiting to launch major operations, the Taliban seeks to preserve its strength so that it can escalate operations once the US has decreased its presence in Afghanistan. Once enough US troops leave, Taliban forces may escalate, taking back the US-led coalition’s hard-won gains.
While the Taliban has been strategically patient, it also coordinates limited tactical level violence to decrease American willingness to stay. In fact, violence in Afghanistan has worsened since the start of the negotiations this year as the Taliban seeks to increase its negotiating leverage. Withdrawing troops now or even as part of a deal that does not ensure a power sharing arrangement could lead to a quick Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
Even more dangerous to US interests, al Qaeda and the Islamic State are also waiting for American troops to withdraw. The Taliban pose a threat to a stable Afghanistan, but the major danger that Americans should fear is that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would again shield terrorist organizations that seek to target US interests at home and abroad.
Announcing intentions to withdraw has strategic problems beyond Afghanistan. America’s other adversaries, including ISIS, Iran, Russia, and China, are also taking note. Combined with the Syria withdrawal, further troop reductions in Afghanistan would invite adversaries to fill the vacuum and signal that America is retreating from the region.
Prior efforts to schedule troop withdrawals have allowed adversaries to fill the vacuum that these troops leave behind.
President Barack Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq in 2011 in adherence to a Status of Forces Agreement signed during the Bush administration, but America’s partners were not ready to bear the full responsibility of maintaining security across the country. By 2014, ISIS was surging across Syria and into Iraq, and the US-trained Iraqi Army was collapsing.
Just before this ISIS expansion in 2014, the US had planned a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, from 34,000 troops to under 10,000, then 5,500 troops within a year, and finally a complete withdrawal by 2016. However, Obama backtracked on this decision, fearing a similar breakdown would occur in Afghanistan as had happened in Iraq.
More recently, the US withdrawal from Syria offers an example of how a premature troop withdrawal can endanger America’s partners and interests. America’s withdrawal from northeastern Syria has already allowed Russia, Iran, and Turkey to fill the vacuum while ISIS fighters escape from prison and prepare to re-surge. Like the rest of the world, the Taliban has noted America’s withdrawal from Syria and seeks to create a similar vacuum in Afghanistan.
If the administration is committed to a withdrawal, then it should avoid officially or unofficially announcing its decision and keep troop levels stable as it negotiates with the Taliban so as to avoid conceding negotiating leverage. Instead of making a troop withdrawal the focus of negotiations, the US should seek a power-sharing arrangement that would reinforce democracy and limit the Taliban’s ability to retake complete control of Afghanistan. Only once the Taliban demonstrates its commitment to maintain the peace and prevent terrorists such as al Qaeda and ISIS from proliferating should the US begin a phased withdrawal.
The US may be readying itself to wind down America’s involvement in Afghanistan, but there are dangerous consequences for doing so improperly. Conducting a precipitous withdrawal ignores the steep price the US, coalition, and Afghan partners have already paid in blood and treasure for a stable, free Afghanistan. This could potentially undo significant counterterrorism and democracy-building steps that would roll back the clock to before the 2001 invasion.
