Seventeen years after the American invasion of Afghanistan, the country remains the scene of one of the unresolved armed conflicts of the 21st century. The initial military mission had two objectives. The first was to destroy the al-Qaida movement, which had recently mounted spectacular terrorist attacks against New York and Washington. The second was to destroy the Taliban movement, which as the government of Afghanistan had played host to al-Qaida. Neither of those objectives have been achieved. Quite the contrary. From its mountain headquarters in Pakistan, al-Qaida has spread to Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Niger and Mali. Al-Qaida is now a more potent and widespread terrorist force than it ever was before. As for the Taliban, they have certainly not been destroyed. Surviving numerous tactical defeats in Afghanistan, they have reconstituted their forces and are now mounting ever more successful attacks on the Afghan government’s security apparatus.
Afghanistan has waxed and waned as a subject of media attention over the years. Most recently it once again made the headlines in late December when it was reported that President Donald Trump had decided to cut in half the American military presence in Afghanistan. These reports gained credence since they came on the heels of his decision to withdraw American forces from Syria. They caused dismay in Kabul and among NATO allies who had not been consulted, even though they still had troops in Afghanistan. This dismay was only partially allayed when a White House spokesman subsequently denied the reports and said President Trump had not ordered a troop withdrawal. Given the way that the president has beat hot and cold over Afghanistan during the past three years, anything seemed possible and still does. Inconsistency is his middle name.
But beyond the headlines, what are the fundamentals of the situation? Many have remained unchanged, but others have deteriorated over time. The Afghan government continues to suffer from the problems that have afflicted it for years. The government is divided along ethnic lines, and Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks continue to vie for supremacy within its ranks. These divisions are sufficient to undermine policy making and policy delivery. Corruption remains widespread at every level and serves to weaken the government’s ability to carry out its main functions. And the public at large has little confidence in a government that has been able to do very little to address the country’s extreme poverty and illiteracy. To say that the government enjoys very little popular support is an understatement.
The armed opposition to the government has, if anything, grown over time. The Taliban have been able to exploit dissatisfaction among the country’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, to significantly increase the numbers of their recruits. They have also been able to secure new members from among the students and graduates of Pakistan’s religious schools, the madrassas. Split between their bases in Pakistan and operational units in Afghanistan, the Taliban now represent an effective insurgent force that has known many successes on the ground in recent years. The Taliban are not, however, the only armed element confronting the Afghan government. There are at least two others. The Haqqani networks based in Pakistan have been responsible for some particularly bloody bomb attacks. Finally there is the Islamic State, best known for its involvement in Iraq and Syria, but which began to create cells in Afghanistan two years ago. The Islamic State has mounted a number of spectacular and bloody bomb attacks in the capital Kabul.
In the face of all of this armed opposition, the Afghan government is continuing to lose ground. A recent US government report estimates that the Afghan government now exercises control or influence over only 55 per cent of the country. The rest is in the hands of insurgents. And the Afghan government is in a poor position to try to reverse this trend. Its security forces are now 40,000 recruits below their target strength. This is perhaps not astonishing given that between 30 and 40 soldiers and policemen have been killed on a daily basis in recent months. Being a member of the security forces is a very dangerous occupation, and it is understandable that many are reluctant to put themselves in harm’s way. The fact that many of them are also poorly trained and equipped only adds to the problems.
The Afghan security forces are now being trained and aided by 14,000 American soldiers and by a few thousand soldiers from other NATO countries. These numbers are minuscule by comparison with those of 2010, when the United States alone had more than 100,000 troops in the country. If even with those kinds of numbers the United States and its NATO allies were unable to bring to an end the insurgency led by the Taliban, what chance do the undermanned, ill-disciplined and ill-equipped Afghan forces have of doing so? The simple answer is virtually none. So long as the Taliban and the other opposition movements continue to fight, they will come to occupy ever more territory.
The situation in Afghanistan is further complicated by the interests and intrigues of neighboring or nearby countries. The Russians are firmly determined that Afghanistan should not remain under American influence. The Saudis continue to support the Islamist opponents of the government. The Indians are very deliberately cultivating the Afghan government, both diplomatically and economically, as part of their efforts to contain Pakistan. The Pakistani military intelligence apparatus continues to support the Taliban in the hopes that it will one day form a government friendly to Pakistan. The Iranians occasionally intervene in support of their Shia co-religionists, the Hazzara, as do the Tajiks and Uzbeks on behalf of their ethnic brethren. In other words, Afghanistan is a cauldron of contending national interests.
Many in the United States government have long recognized that there is no military solution to the situation in Afghanistan and have advocated a negotiated settlement. To try to bring this about, a senior American envoy has recently held meetings with representatives of the Taliban and urged them to enter into peace negotiations with the Afghan government. So far his efforts have led nowhere. The question hanging over this endeavor is: what if the government and the Taliban could reach a peaceful settlement? In that case, there would emerge a new government split down the middle between Islamists and moderates, hardly a recipe for stability. And what of the other opposition movements? Would they necessarily follow the lead of the Taliban in making peace? The situation in Afghanistan is so complex that it lends itself to neither military nor diplomatic solutions. It is a quagmire.
There will, of course, come a time when the American government and the American people will tire of their Afghan mission, which has cost them thousands of lives and billions of dollars. They will one day withdraw their troops. When is not clear yet, despite the fact that the campaign is now in its 18th year, the longest such military enterprise in American history. What does seem clear is that the Taliban and their allies seem prepared to wait out the Americans in the hope of once again gaining control of Afghanistan.
