The blunders that keep lengthening Afghan conflict

Today marks the 17th anniversary of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan that precipitated the longest war in American history, with no end yet in sight. Despite thousands of lives sacrificed, and hundreds of billions of dollars and almost two decades of time spent, Afghanistan and the United States continue to face the same threats and challenges they were faced with before this costly war. Afghanistan is yet to become safe from the scourge of terrorism, something America stated as the primary reason for its invasion of the country. Before the attack, Al-Qaeda was the only global terror group operating in Afghanistan. According to Afghan government and Americans, there are now at least 20 terror groups active in the war-battered county, an indicator that the US military presence in the country has backfired, because it has exacerbated than eliminated the menace of terrorism.
Americans made two major mistakes in the war on terror. Firstly, they did not truly attend to the state sponsorship of terrorism, and secondly, no adequate efforts were made for reconciliation and a political deal with the Taliban as the main insurgent group fighting Afghan government. These two factors together have led to the protraction of the conflict for about two decades.
Although Afghan government and people told the international community after the escalation of Taliban activities that Pakistan is supporting all terror groups operating in the region, including the Taliban, the US-led international coalition concentrated attacks on Afghan villages instead of acting against Islamabad. The outcome of the move was clear. It is impossible to defeat the militants when there are porous borders and insurgent groups enjoy state support, yet the United States repeatedly increased the number of its troops in Afghanistan. The casualties of Afghan civilians increased with each troop surge, which increasingly alienated and disgruntled Afghan people. Washington neither stopped Pakistan from supporting the Taliban nor convinced the Taliban to join Afghanistan’s mainstream politics through a successful peace process. These are the very mistakes that prolonged Afghan conflict whose end is still not in sight.