On 29 February, representatives from the US and the Taliban — who had been at war for 19 years — came together in Doha, Qatar, to sign the ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.’ The deal set deadlines for a US withdrawal from the country in exchange for promises by the Taliban that it would not protect al-Qaeda or any other militant group that threatens Washington. Since the signing of the deal, the Taliban has refocused its attacks on the people of Afghanistan instead of US troops, demonstrating its resolve to continue with jihad, come what may.
The deal validates the Pakistani security-intelligence establishment’s thinking that should it continue to arm, fund and encourage a proxy militant group, like it did with the Taliban, it can be successful in achieving its goal — getting a leg up in strategic and political decision-making in a country.
In the case of Afghanistan, since the US announced its intention to begin a dialogue with the Taliban, Pakistan has been in the driver’s seat. Islamabad has repeatedly stated its “commitment to play the role of facilitator” in the talks, doing its “best to bring the Afghan Taliban to the table with America.”
To demonstrate its ‘good faith’, Pakistan released Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar from a Karachi prison in October 2018. Baradar has since become the chief negotiator for the Taliban. During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Washington in July 2019, he said he intended to meet the Taliban and encourage them to talk to the Afghan government, stating that the peace talks should lead to “an inclusive Afghan election” where the Taliban participates as well. This is indicative of what Islamabad wants from Kabul — an ascendant Taliban will lead to a power-sharing arrangement that will align with its vision for ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan (or in simple words, a Pakistan-friendly government).
A steady US withdrawal from Afghanistan will solidify the thinking that Pakistan’s long-standing support of the Taliban has paid off. When the US first entered Afghanistan in 2001, it made a partnership of convenience with Pakistan, whereby the latter received large amounts of financial and military support in exchange for targeting terrorist and militant sanctuaries along its border with Afghanistan. While the Pakistan army targeted certain groups, it turned a blind eye to others that did not threaten its immediate interests. Now that the US is ready to pack its bags and leave, Pakistan hopes it will be “rewarded” with a friendly government in Kabul and continuing financial support from the US. Islamabad is now one step closer to achieving this goal as the exiting US will still need it to secure the border with Afghanistan and the Taliban is in a strong position to negotiate with the Kabul government.
Another consequence of the US-Taliban deal is the potential for a resurgence, revival and resurrection of other Islamist jihadi groups in the subcontinent.
Before 9/11, when the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan (1996-2001), al-Qaeda operated a number of terrorist training camps across the country, fostering close bonds with other Islamic groups in the region, particularly those from Pakistan. When ISIS opened up its branch in the region (ISKP), it was able to establish itself along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border despite the area already being controlled by groups such as al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network. Other groups that were previously associated with al-Qaeda, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and factions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, joined ISKP, with it also recruiting new militants from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Today, the ISKP and al-Qaeda remain alive and active despite the Taliban’s promises to sever ties with the latter. Al-Qaeda’s longevity over the years can be credited to its connections and collaborations with local groups. The Haqqani Network, which are armed allies of the Pakistani army, has also established strong ties with a wide variety of terrorist groups. Today, despite ideological differences between the groups, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISKP enjoy the benefits of overlapping loyalties, shared military commanders and, of course, the patronage of the Pakistani establishment.
Risks for the neighbourhood
The complicated terrorist-militant-criminal nexus between the various groups in the region threatens the stability of South Asia. Should the Taliban gain some political power or representation in Kabul, it could result in a morale booster for other Islamist militant groups in the region. The Taliban’s extremist interpretation of Islam and understanding of Islamic jurisprudence or sharia law would directly threaten the many political, judicial, social and cultural reforms made by the Afghan government post 2001. It would embolden the Haqqani Network, with one leg in Kabul, to support other groups such as the al-Qaeda.
The US-Taliban agreement makes no mention of the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) or other affiliates, only marking al-Qaeda and its presence in Afghanistan as a threat to US interests. The AQIS poses a serious threat to India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan, given not only its operational capabilities but the fact that it has a number of fighters embedded within the Taliban ranks. AQIS has also been successful in bringing different groups and organisations across state boundaries together under the al-Qaeda banner, including the Ansar Ghazwat ul-Hind, Harkat ul-Mujahideen and Indian Mujahideen in India and Ansar al-Islam and Jammat ul-Mujaideen in Bangladesh.
In India, AQIS runs a strong propaganda campaign that seeks to capitalise on cleavages between the Hindu majority and Muslim minority, describing Indian Muslims as “living under the shade of Hindu occupation.” Its jihadist magazine regularly publishes calls for Muslims to support the Afghan Taliban and adhere to Islamic sharia laws. In 2019, al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahari asked mujahideen in Kashmir to “inflict unrelenting blows on the Indian army and government” to make the Indian economy “bleed and suffer sustained losses.”
While AQIS has focused its Indian campaign on developing propaganda on the “injustices” against Muslims in the country, it also criticised India for supporting and promoting secular policies in Bangladesh. Since 2014, when AQIS inserted itself into the Bangladeshi jihadi landscape, it has carried out attacks that target secular activists, liberal bloggers, atheists and members of the LGBTQ community due to a perceived assault on Islamic values.
In Buddhist-majority Myanmar, AQIS highlights the violence against the persecuted Rohingya community, seeking to radicalise and recruit the disillusioned Rohingya.
A Taliban “victory” in Afghanistan would also cause India great concern since it could provide fresh fuel for anti-India terrorist groups operating in the Kashmir area. Groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba have previously cooperated with the Taliban and have been found orchestrating attacks in Afghanistan as well. The attack on Indian security forces in February 2019 in Pulwama was carried out by a suicide bomber reportedly inspired by the “Taliban victory” in Afghanistan. The bomber, a JeM member, encouraged Kashmiri youth to wage jihad against India, underlying the success of the jihad waged by the Taliban against the US. Such cases of ‘jihadi inspiration’ could increase once the US leave Afghanistan.
Three of the Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan share a direct border with Afghanistan and will likely be directly impacted should there be an uptick in violence in the northern part of the country. Since the signing of the deal, terrorist groups in these countries such as Jamaat Ansarulla (Tajikistan), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (Uzbekistan) and Turkestan Islamic Party have congratulated the Taliban, calling the withdrawal of international forces a victory of “Islamic Ummah,” confidently believing that the Taliban would not cut off ties with al-Qaeda.
Afghanistan’s neighbourhood remains at risk because of the apparent political legitimacy of the Taliban and the durability of groups such as the al-Qaeda. The withdrawal of US troops from the region has the potential to be used by other militant Islamist groups as grounds for recruitment and radicalisation, motivated by the success of the Taliban in driving the US out of the country. Groups that maintain ties to AQIS could, through the use of social media, further strengthen their ranks by using the Taliban “victory” as propaganda to recruit and radicalise vulnerable youth.
Can the Taliban change?
The agreement between the US and the Taliban assumes that the Taliban have changed and evolved since 2001. It is predicated on the belief that the Taliban can honor the promises it makes to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a launch pad for attacks against the US and its allies. Trusting the Taliban to uphold this commitment is the basis on which the US has agreed to withdraw from the country. This risky and precarious move grants legitimacy to the Taliban and what it stands for. There is no evidence that the Taliban has turned over a new leaf, or that it has changed its stance on human rights, women’s education, democracy and secular values. Yet, the deal grants it a certain degree of respect and empowerment. The deal temporarily shields US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, but has directly harmed Afghan civilians, security forces and allies in the region.
The deal with the Taliban lacks any type of an enforcement mechanism. What will happen if the Taliban falls back into the al-Qaeda’s embrace once the US leaves? Will this mean a return of US forces? Can the US guarantee there will be no future terrorist attacks on its soil? Has it ensured the security of their allies in the region? The deal’s success hinges on the Taliban’s ability to be sincere and truthful, a tall order for a militant group that has shown no remorse in killing its compatriots. If the Taliban renege on their end of the deal, Afghanistan could turn into a hotbed for internal strife and terrorism, which will affect the gains made by the international community over the last two decades.
